Written by Muhsin Puthan Purayil
The Kerala Story depicts a frightening fusion of Indian politics and cinema. The movie reflects India’s political environment, where deeply partisan and divisive narratives can serve as political instruments to win elections. Movies like The Kashmir Files, The Tashkent Files, PM Narendra Modi, The Accidental Prime Minister, and Hindutva Chapter One - Main Hindu Hoon are just a few examples of films being cynically exploited as potent venues for political discourse. The massive support in terms of promotion and tax reliefs these movies received from the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) shows its penchant for the politics of the silver screen.
Indeed, this preoccupation is fostered not just by the political environment. There are at least three interrelated rationales that drive it. First, movies are a low-cost option to pursue mass political mobilisation. Second, visuals are more real and become more politically effective when one wants to fortify a particular narrative and create an alternative reality. Third, the explosive expansion of social media and OTT platforms amplifies the visual story even more.
Becoming the latest example of this perilous alliance between politics and cinema, The Kerala Story has sparked controversies and enquiries into the veracity of facts, reason, and inclusivity.
The trailer of the movie revealed some terrible truths about the limitless propagandistic ruse in the political utilisation of films. The movie’s portrayal of religious conversion as a ploy for ISIS recruitment was dubious at best. The assertion that around 32,000 women from Kerala converted to Islam and joined ISIS while being “inspired by true events,” lacked verifiable data to substantiate it. Although a great deal of controversy the claim generated forced the movie’s creators to change the figure to three, the modification was not made until the trailer had received 17 million views.
Although it cannot be disputed that individuals from Kerala joined ISIS, which is a serious concern regardless of how few, the scope of their involvement has been greatly exaggerated.
Contrary to what the movie portrays, the number of Indian combatants with ties to ISIS remains low. In fact, as of 2021, the US State Department’s assessment found that there were just 66 combatants of Indian origins. However, according to Indian security agencies’ estimation, between 100 and 120 people from Kerala have either tried to join or have already joined ISIS. Nonetheless, this data does not support the notion that the story of Kerala is the story of ‘love jihad’ being employed to recruit non-Muslims to ISIS.
Make no mistake, this grossly evident factual disparity then speaks to an intent to perpetuate the myth of ‘love jihad,’ an Islamophobic conspiracy theory put forth by Hindutva supporters who claim that Muslim males marry women of other faiths to convert them to Islam to increase their population.
However, all the factual inaccuracies and the myth-making notwithstanding, the huge attention the movie received, if early reports are any indications, suggests that its implications for the country’s political landscape are palpably real, not least because the state elections in Karnataka are scheduled for May 10th, with the general elections to follow the next year.
As things stand, one pertinent question that comes up here is - what does the movie say about BJP’s electoral strategy and the embedding political dynamics at play? One could argue that the movie plays a prelude to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) election campaigns and has implications for entrenching the party’s narrative campaign of ‘love jihad’ in three theatres of electoral politics.
Strategic implications for elections
First, it has the potential to significantly contribute to the BJP’s endeavour to reinforce a national case about ‘love jihad.’ It is important to emphasise that although officially refuted on a factual basis by probing agencies and by the ruling party itself in the parliament, the narrative of ‘love jihad’ as a form of othering through consciousness-raising remains a potent instrument of cognitive appeal.
That it is powerful enough to churn fears and deepen the communal divide and even communal riots, as seen in the past. Further, its institutionalisation through draconian laws threatening interfaith love and marriage continues to entrench social fragmentation.
Notably, several states, including Karnataka, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Odisha, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh have brought in anti-conversion legislation. There are instances of arrests being made in the name of ‘love jihad’ targeting interfaith couples just because of complaints from the girls’ family who disapproves of interfaith marriages. For this reason, one can say that the political logic of ‘love jihad’ narrative is hardly in question. Instead, its pursuit is not only politically prudent but also needs to be reckoned with in India’s current political scenario marked by majoritarian politics and mounting communal polarisation.
Second, The Kerala Story simply fosters a continuation of the political strategy BJP has been seen to favour in Karnataka, where corruption allegations have defaced the government with mounting anti-incumbency dampening state leadership’s re-election prospects. As a result, Hindu nationalism’s hallmark of emphasising communal issues has been intensified in Karnataka politics.
Only recently have issues surrounding Hijab, aazan, halaal, and idgah sparked communal tensions within the state in a bid to retain power. Moreover, election campaigns were dotted with senior leaders and ministers from the party, such as Amit Shah, Yogi Adityanath, Rajnath Singh, and JP Nadda, engaging in mobilisations along communal lines. People were warned against voting for the Congress because it was claimed to have institutionalised quotas based on religion and that, if elected to power, would spark an era of communal riots.
Notably, the BJP is eager to maintain its grip on Karnataka, its sole stronghold in Southern India, as it seeks to expand its influence in other states in the region. In that context, the movie’s portrayal of ‘love jihad,’ albeit barely new in the state, can be viewed as contributing as a last resort to the BJP’s effort to shape the voter’s preference by reigniting the issue in voters’ minds, stressing its perceived severity. Evidently, the Karnataka BJP chief, Nalin Kumar Kateel, has reportedly advised party members to prioritise combating ‘love jihad’ over development works in election campaigns.
Third and more important, the narrative of ‘love jihad’ perpetrated through the movie must be viewed in Kerala’s context. Here, it signifies the unfolding of a brand-new divisive tool intended to contribute to forging a new political equation centered around a political bonhomie between the Christian electorate and the BJP. The party’s lavish outreach and the recent increase in affinity with the state's Christian population attest to BJP’s doubling down on a new majoritarian political endgame in Kerala.
In this regard, it is worth noting that as the party attempts to recover from a position of political irrelevance in Kerala's electoral politics since independence, Christian community leaders have been observed cosying up to the party. For instance, the Syro-Malabar Catholic Church in Kerala has vowed to back the BJP provided the Central government solves the concerns of rubber cultivators. If anything, this shows that the top religious leadership is comfortable holding hands with the BJP if the party can secure its interests. The Syro-Malabar Catholic Church is a dominant Christian denomination in Kerala. Needless to say, the party’s political fantasy of a significant elevation of its stature seems to have been given wings by the positive remarks from these influential figures.
In that context, the BJP is looking to incorporate the ‘love jihad’ narrative as a component of its final push towards reaching out to the Christian community. Recently, more influential Christian clergy from the state have flirted with the narrative, although voices from the same community have resisted such campaigns. For instance, a prominent Catholic Bishop has alleged that Christian community members and other non-Muslim faiths, particularly young men, and women, are being targeted and seduced through ‘love jihad’ and ‘narcotic jihad.'
Overall, by highlighting the unsettling interface of cinema and politics, The Kerala Story gives insights into the wider political dynamics at play. Fundamentally, the movie will function to maintain the existing vote bank around Hindu consolidation in national politics and in the state politics of Karnataka as it plays a part in finding new directions and pathways for crafting a winning formula in Kerala. Anyway, the game is open.
Muhsin is a PhD scholar in Political Science at the University of Hyderabad.
Views expressed are author’s own.